Did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable
If you order your research paper from our custom writing service you will receive a perfectly written assignment on did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable. What we need from you is to provide us with your detailed paper instructions for our experienced writers to follow all of your specific writing requirements. Specify your order details, state the exact number of pages required and our custom writing professionals will deliver the best quality did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable paper right on time.
Our staff of freelance writers includes over 120 experts proficient in did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable, therefore you can rest assured that your assignment will be handled by only top rated specialists. Order your did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable paper at affordable prices!
Did the policy of appeasement go to any great lengths toward stopping the outbreak of war or did it simply delay the inevitable?
The task of explaining why appeasement, has been continuously addressed by historians over the years. To date, there is still no single cause identified. Nonetheless there is however a general consensus amongst historians that the frightful events of world war one, distilled a sense of fear and regret amongst British society, and consequently Britain strived to prevent any future war, through whatever means necessary. In the aftermath of World War 1, lay a mutual understanding between the British government and society that never again should a catastrophe such as World War 1 occur, it was described as the war to end all wars reinforcing the view that it was a cataclysmic event which should never be re-enacted upon society. British public became disillusioned with the use of force in international relations and as a result sought an approach consisting of an effective system of collective security. In post war society anti-war books, films and poems all became increasingly well liked and several pacifist pressure groups were formed with the sole aim of achieving peaceful solutions to international problems. These groups were known as The Peace Pledge Union, The Peace Society and the No More War Movement. World War 1 essentially left Britain in a state of mourning, and accordingly thousands of war monuments were erected, and an annual day of mourning and remembrance was established, known as Remembrance Sunday. This was an attempt to pay tribute to those heroes lost in the war and to act as a subtle reminder of the devastation caused by the war in a bid to prevent any future conflict. As a result of the desolation a common consensus was becoming apparent amid the general public, which was that, there were no clear societal gains from the war and the obvious economic, and political decline of the country showed no gains in that sector either. Hence the reduction of arms and peace became vote winners in elections. Appeasement can be defined as a disposition to avoid conflict by judicious concession and negotiation. Neville Chamberlain noted that the British public would not wish nor accept another war. Therefore the British government sought to follow a policy of appeasement. However, everyone did not share the acceptance of the policy of appeasement. Looking on with hindsight many historians have condemned the actions of Chamberlain and his government. Especially the Liberal party of the time who were the most consistant critics of the policy. As it became evident that the policy of appeasement had failed in 1 and that Britain would in fact go to war, the Liberal Leader Sir Archibald Sinclair expressed his feelings on the achievements of appeasement We have eaten dirt in vain This statement is clearly expressing the fact that Britain has tolerated the deceitful acts of Germany to no avail or successes. That the policy of appeasement was deemed to fail from the onset. Concluding that the policy was pointless as it only prolonged the inevitable. In order to make an informed conclusion to whether or not appeasement was the correct policy to pursue, it is essential to look at the events and debates leading up to the out-break of world war . The system of collective security, which was in part demanded by the British Public, came in the form of The League Of Nations. This was to be a system in which international disputes between nations would be settled by negotiation. The responsibility of the League was to act as an arbitrator in disputes between nations and to provide effective collective security against any form of military aggression. There were mixed opinions towards the League. Alan Sharp had referred to the League of Nations as a compromise agreement, which pleased none of the parties involved. It was also referred to by Marshall Foch, the military commander-in-chief of the allied armies at the end of the war as, this is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years. These statements clearly show the harsh realities of the League. It was indeed a harsh peace, which did not completely satisfy the needs of all countries involved. Many feel it was essentially an opportunity for France to impose harsh repercussions on Germany for the destruction of her country. The main provisions of the League were The German army was to be limited to 100,000 and conscription banned. The navy was also to be reduced to a coastal force and the building of submarines and battleships were forbidden so too, was a German air force. She was also to lose European territory including Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen, Malmedy, North Schleswig, West Prussia, Poznania, and parts of Upper Silesia and Memel, and all her non-European colonies were to be placed under the control of the League of Nations. The Saar coalmining region was to be placed under the leagues control until 15 and all foreign currency and gold was to be confiscated. A union with Austria was forbidden and Germany was ordered to pay £6,600 million in reparations in war damages and pensions inflicted on Britain, Italy and France. She was also forced to accept guilt for starting the war and had to agree to accept a democratic constitution. Britain especially held a widespread consensus that the treaty of Versailles had punished Germany too harshly for starting and losing the First World War. Thus Britain to an extent felt that the unjust nature of the treaty might provoke Germany to reverse the terms of the peace by force. Thus Britain and France instead of backing the League and collective security, preferred appeasement. Therefore the League lacking strong support, failed to curb the aggressors. This was highlighted in the event of 7th March 16 when Germany Remilitarised the Rhineland. Under the treaty of Versailles the Rhineland was declared a demilitarised zone, this can be looked upon as an act of aggression as it breaks the terms of the treaty of Versailles, and also the Locarno agreement. Hitlers decision to remilitarise the Rhineland at this stage of events was triggered by the fact that Britain and France were to preoccupied with the Abyssinian crisis to pay much attention to his actions, the remilitarisation also took place on a Saturday which meant limited resistance. Hitler Reckoned that by the time those who were in a position to take any action were back at work it would all be over. However whilst acknowledging his army was in no position to withstand French opposition, Hitler ordered his troops to withdraw if such opposition occurred. The French however offered no such opposition. Instead the French sought the support of Britain, however the view that Germany had been to severely treated at Versailles was dominant within British society and Chamberlains policy was to appease Hitler's actions stating that Germany has the right to station their troops anywhere within its own country. Continuing with this view lord Lothian sated they are only going into there own back garden. These statements clearly act in favour of appeasement, expressing that military action against Germanys actions was not necessary as she is clearly retaliating against the unjust nature of the Versailles settlement, remilitarising her troops in a part of her own country was seen as no clear threat towards Britain and France. However Britain did accelerate her rearmament programme. The view that the reoccupation of the Rhineland was no threat to France was heavily challenged by Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary, stating that Another idea which ought to be combatted was the prevail ant one that the occupation of the Rhineland was no threat to France. It was a threat because so long as the Rhineland was demilitarised, the Germans in order to invade France through Belgium, would have to use large forces to hold the Rhineland and their striking forces would be reduced. After occupying the Rhineland, they could fortify it, hold the frontier with a relatively small force, and greatly increase their striking force on the northern bank. Therefore Eden is clearly stating that the remilitarisation f the Rhineland was indeed a clear threat to France and international peace. Winston Churchill was also a clear critic of the policy of appeasement stating that We cannot look back with much pleasure on our foreign policy.... the violation of the Rhineland is serious because of the menace to which it exposes Holland Belgium and France. Therefore Churchill is expressing that the undermining of democracy was a serious event when taken in context. Historically speaking, the appeasement of Hitler over the reoccupation of the Rhineland has been extensively criticised. With the benefit of hindsight it has been perceived as the last chance to stop Hitler, without war had been lost. However this criticism is not fully conclusive as to stop Hitler would indeed have fundamentally required military action, which neither Britain and France were ready for due to the strong consensus amongst their societies for the avoidance of any military conflict, which had resulted in slow military rearmament. ] The next stage in which Britains policy of appeasement was increasingly tested was the Spanish civil war. The civil war, which erupted in Spain in July 16, was perceived by the majority of Europe as a struggle between the aggressive and advancing doctrine of fascism and the weakening force of democracy. It was essentially a divided nation รข€" fascism v democracy The Spanish civil war was initially the result of an army revolt, which broke out against the Spanish left-wing republican government. Francisco Franco assumed the leader of the revolt, a quick victory was anticipated however the eventual outcome spanned over several years, with violent carnage committed by both sides. The French leader Leon Blum was sympathetic towards the republican government, but was fearful of a right wing backlash. The decision by Blum to restrict aid to the Spanish government was taken due to Britains claim that they would not support him in the event of a war against Germany. Blum therefore suggested a policy of non-intervention by all European powers be promoted. Consequently the British government were enthusiastic of this policy but always presented it as a French initiative. Therefore the non-intervention committee included Britain, France Russia, Germany and Italy. The republicans felt they could effectively win the war if foreign powers could be persuaded to stay out. However Mussolini and Hitler broke the agreement and sent extensive help to Franco. Italy sent at least 40,000 troops equipped with mobile artillery, armoured cars, fighters, and reconnaissance planes. Mussolini regarded Franco as a friendly fascist and therefore was prepared to help. Hitler however was seen to provide even more extensive aid to Franco, this is because he realised that Britain and France would not take a stand. He provided vital planes to transport Francos army across from Morocco in early weeks of war; he also sent troops but no more than 10,000. He also provided an increasing amount of superior equipment, which in large part allowed the successful nationalist advances of 18/. This may have been the result of the weaknesses of the League of Nations, as the league failed to enforce the non-intervention policy. The league initially called for the withdrawal of foreign participation, but did nothing to back up its demands. The Republicans also claimed that the policy of non-intervention was illegal since it denied help to a government recognised by the league, while failing to stop German and Italian aggression against that government. However by this stage in time the league had come to be recognised as a spent force. However one success was British and French patrolling of Mediterranean to stop activity of รข€˜private submarines' (in use by Italians). British and French navies were ordered to attack any submarines or aircraft attacking non-Spanish ships. This demonstrated that it paid to be firm with fascists. British opinion on the breach of the non-intervention policy was mixed. Some of the left wing groups for example, the I.L.P and the Communist Party wanted the government to support the republic against Spanish fascism, however the Labour part under its new leader did not want to become involved and Chamberlain was determined on non-intervention as he saw no sense in preparing for war over a quarrel in a country so far away that we know little of. Anthony Eden also supports the policy of non-intervention. He states The policy of non-intervention has limited and bit-by-bit reduced the flow of foreign intervention in arms and men into Spain. Even more importantly, the existence of that policy, the knowledge that many governments, despite all discouragement were working for it, has greatly reduced the risk of a general war... Six months ago, I told the house of commons of my conviction that intervention in Spain was both bad humanity and bad politics. Nothing that has happened since has caused me to modify that judgement; some events have caused me to confirm it. Clearly Anthony Eden is in strong support of the non-intervention policy. He feels that by all European powers promoting this policy the risk of a general war is substantially reduced. Therefore he favours the system of collective security promoted by the League of Nations. However not everyone was in support of the non-intervention policy. An extract from J. Gurney 174) states that The Spanish civil war seemed to provide the chance for a single individual to take a positive and effective stand on an issue which seemed to be absolutely clear. Either you were opposed to the growth of fascism and went out to fight against it, or you acquiesced in its crimes and were guilty of permitting its growth. There were many people who claimed it was a foreign quarrel and that nobody other than the Spaniards should involve themselves in it. But for myself and many others like me, it was a war of principle, and principles do not have national boundaries. By fighting against Fascism in Spain, we would be fighting against it in our own country, and every other. This source clearly states that the policy of non-intervention was utterly a disgrace, European powers should have intervened and overthrown the Fascist dictators. By doing so in this country would have sent a message that fascism would strongly be opposed in their own countries. However in the end Britain and France did not intervene which meant, eventually Italian and German help proved crucial in securing victory for Franco. Franco's victory was essentially another triumph for Hitler. He had again defeated France and Britain in that he had ignored non-intervention, which was also the policy of the league, and had continued to support Franco. Democracy had again been discredited and authoritarian fascism appeared triumphant. National opinion too in the democracies was divided by the war. Vast differences of opinion existed, as how to deal with the รข€˜fascist menace' proved evident. However this proved to be another example, which highlighted the true weakness of appeasement. The method of giving ground to the dictators in the hope that they would be satisfied and pacified was clearly limited. The backing down of the Italians over the private submarine incident showed what a firm stance could achieve. However the lesson was not learned, Britain was again about to try and appease Hitler. The Treaty of Versailles stated in its terms that a German union with Austria was forbidden, and until 18 none of Hitlers actions actually overridden the territorial frontiers established in 11. A claim made by Hitler on the day of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland stated Germany has no territorial claims to make in Europe However subsequent events proved how deceitful this was. Hitler's overall objective was the union of all German-speaking people into a greater Germany. Several attempts were made at this. In 14 the German backed Austrian Nazi party made the first attempt at a possible union with Austria. However it resulted in disorder and violence and was consequently banned by Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss. The attempted overthrow of the Austrian government by the party resulted in the assassination of Dollfuss. This was indeed how far the party got in reaching its goal. Mussolinis hostility prevented Hitler from taking advantage of this attempt. As a result of this, in July 16 a gentlemans agreement was formed between Germany and Austria, in which, Germany promised to respect Austrian independence and not to interfere in Austrian internal affairs. However in January 18 Austrian police uncovered plans by the Austrian Nazi party to cause trouble with the ultimate aim of provoking German invasion. In response to this, the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg arranged a meeting with Hitler to prevent a Nazi overthrow. Consequently Hitler took the offensive and accused Schuschnigg of persecuting patriotic Germans and of breaking the 16 agreement. The Austrian Chancellor retaliated and organised a plebiscite on the subject of union, which was thought to end in a negative response. As a result Hitler mobilised forces on the frontier, the arranged plebiscite was cancelled and Schuschnigg resigned. However this was all too late and German troops entered Austria on 1 March. By the 1 March the German union with Austria was cemented. Consequently a further plebiscite saw a .75% vote in favour of Anschluss. British opinion to the Anschluss was mixed. Chamberlains policy was still to appease Germanys actions. However he did criticise the methods used to obtain the union the Austria, and called for the withdrawal of troops, however he did nothing to back this up. The positive result of the plebiscite gave chamberlain an excuse for not reacting and therefore he still felt the policy of appeasement was working. It was also felt among the British that Germany had a limited number of reasonable demands. These demands arose from the Treaty of Versailles about which the British had begun to feel guilty. The union with Austria was perceived by many as an inevitable event, which should have occurred long ago. This opinion was highlighted from an extract from the editorial, Kilmarnock Standard, 1th March 18. It states Austria is no longer an independent country. It is one of the states that comprise Germany. It was natural and inevitable that such a union should occur sooner or later. Even in the Treaty of Versailles the possibility of it was foreseen...strictly speaking there is no good reason for opposing the union of Germany and Austria. However there were others who were less optimistic about the union of Germany and Austria. Many felt that as the union of Austria provided Hitler with control of the iron and steel industries and a springboard to invade South Eastern Europe. This level of power in the hands of Hitler was perceived by many as a disastrous set of circumstances in which more War and destruction could inevitably be foreseen. This pessimistic view was shared by Winston Churchill 18, in which he states The public mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi conquest of Austriaa small country brutally struck down, its government scattered to the winds, the oppression of the Nazi party doctrine imposed on a catholic population and upon the working classes of Austria and Vienna... But there are some things which I have not seen brought out in the public press... Vienna is the centre of all the communications of all the countries, which formed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and all of the countries lying to the south east of Europe. ...The mastery of Vienna gives to Nazi Germany military and economic control of the whole of the communications of south eastern Europe, by road, by river, and by rail. What is the effect of this upon what is called the balance of power. Here Churchill is voicing his concerns for the safety of Europe, he acknowledges that the balance of power is unwisely tilted to wards Germany, which will inevitably result in more demands and possibly war. The victory of the Anschluss proved yet again that Hitler could get away with international bullying. The British policy of appeasement was clearly failing to control the demands of Hitler. Yet Chamberlain was till rigorously adhering to its policy. The next stage, which highlighted Britains policy of appeasement, related to the sudetanland. It became clear that Hitlers conception of a greater Germany was not content with the Anschluss. His sights were now set on Czechoslovakia where he demanded the Sudetenland, which contained around million Germans. The Sudetenland was initially given to the Czechs by the treaty of St Germain in 11 for practical and defensive reasons. Therefore they and Germany had a legitimate grievance. The Sudetenland was crucial for Hitler if he was hoping to move against Poland or Russia. It had a well-organised army and its own arms industry. It was in the end, Britains attitude however, which largely determined the fate of the Sudetenland and ultimately Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain was not convinced that the Sudetenland was a great enough issue to go to war over. Anxious to avoid war he attended a conference held in Munich in September 18, in which Hitler was also in attendance. Following his policy of appeasement Chamberlain agreed that Hitler could have the Sudetenland, but no more of Czechoslovakia. War seemed to have been avoided as Hitler claimed this was the last of his territorial demands. British opinion to this development was mixed. A. Taylor, the origins of the Second World War states British policy over Czechoslovakia originated in the belief that Germany had a moral right to the Sudeten German territory, on grounds of national principle. The victory for self-determination would provide a more stable more permanent peace in Europe. This statement from Taylor clearly supports the actions of Chamberlain at Munich, and is also in agreement with the British foreign policy of appeasement. By meeting Germanys demands Taylor believes that Chamberlain has avoided the cataclysmic events of World War 1. However there were opponents to this view. As described in a letter to the editor of the Scotsman signed an ashamed peace-lover. am sure that on hearing the result of the Munich conference over the wireless in the early hours of Friday morning, thousands of people all over the world would be shocked and humiliated. Hitler and Mussolini have got practically everything they asked for without firing a shot, and their prestige instead of being diminished in their own countries has gone up by leaps and bounds. Czechoslovakia the victim had no opportunity of a say in the deliberations, which sealed her fate.... At the crucial moment Britain and France have shown clearly that they are unwilling to fight for Czechoslovakia but.. They are willing to guarantee that she hands over her industry, property etc to Hitler as it stands... Britain and France have thrown Czechoslovakia to the wolves. This letter clearly disapproves of the actions and decisions, which took place in Munich. It also questions the policy of appeasement, in that the letter criticises the fact that Hitler and Mussolini are time and time again getting their demands met. The letter also attacks Britain and France for not supporting Czechoslovakia especially when France had an agreement with her. It places sole responsibility on Britain and France for the state of Czechoslovakia. However a year later Hitler broke the agreement, and sent German troops to occupy Prague. Chamberlain reacted at once claiming that Hitler had gone to far and must now be stopped. The poles also rejected Hitlers demands for Danzig, Britain and France promised to help Poland if Germany attacked. Hitler was however somewhat less worried by these claims, as in the past Britain and France had made threats but done nothing in carrying them out, instead they always followed their policy of appeasement. So Hitler took little notice. He grew tired of waiting for Poland to negotiate, so once Hitler had secured a non-aggression pact with Russia, the Germans invaded Poland on 1st September 1, and accordingly Britain and France declared a state of war against Germany. Therefore it can be said that the British foreign policy of appeasement essentially died on 1st September 1 when Germany invaded Poland, some historians argued that it died when the Germans took Prague, others say the Sudetenland. There are mixed opinions towards this policy, and the question why historians have debated appeasement continuously over the passing decades. Many believe that Chamberlains policy of appeasement was fuled by a desire to do everything in his power possible to avoid war, and his belief that all European powers shared the dame feeling. The catastrophic events of World War one set in a deep fear and hatred of war among many. It is also felt that Chamberlain followed the policy of appeasement as a means to buy some time as he realised that British defences were hopelessly inadequate, as British military strength had been greatly reduced due to the commitment of disarmament. Even at the time of the Anschluss Britain was declared unprepared for war. Therefore to conclude, whatever the reasons for the continual policy of appeasement, it can be said that appeasement with the sole aim of preventing war did not succeed, however what it was seen to do was prolong the inevitable. Many strongly feel that the continual demands of Hitler were flared by the lack of opposition, and his continual greed for expansion, his demands were rarely attacked, simply given into with little hesitancy.
Write your did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable research paperPlease note that this sample paper on did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable is for your review only. In order to eliminate any of the plagiarism issues, it is highly recommended that you do not use it for you own writing purposes. In case you experience difficulties with writing a well structured and accurately composed paper on did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable, we are here to assist you. Your persuasive essay on did the policy of appeasment go to any great lengths toward stopping the out break of war or did it simply delay the inevitable will be written from scratch, so you do not have to worry about its originality.
Order your authentic assignment and you will be amazed at how easy it is to complete a quality custom paper within the shortest time possible!